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Is Fiscal Decentralisation Delivering on its Promises? A Review of the 





Fiscal decentralisation has become a widespread phenomenon in developing countries and it 
has attracted increasing attention in the past few decades. The supporters of decentralisation 
argue that it can bring about positive outcomes, whether economic or political in nature. For 
example, since local governments are closer to citizens, they can be expected to be more 
responsive to their needs. In addition, decentralisation may trigger positive effects in terms of 
political participation and accountability. Whether these theoretical benefits are achieved in 
practice is an open question that this paper aims to address. After providing an overview of 
the main issues and challenges in the design and implementation of fiscal decentralisation, 
the paper reviews the existing evidence on the impact of fiscal decentralisation on economic 
and political outcomes at the local level. By doing this it aims to assess whether 
decentralisation delivered on its promises.  
Keywords: fiscal decentralisation; sub-national taxation; intergovernmental transfers; 
property tax; natural resources. 
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Since the 1990s decentralisation has become a widespread phenomenon in the developing 
world, although early experiences began in the 1970s and expanded in the 1980s. 
International organisations and donor countries supported this process, as it was largely 
consistent with parallel developments in the industrialised world such as the prevalence of 
conservative governments and the process of European integration (Olowu and Smoke 
1992; Tanzi 1996). After having been largely ignored for decades in the standard public 
finance literature, decentralisation became a central topic in the 1990s (Tanzi 1996). The 
1988 World Development Report by the World Bank is seen as a landmark in recognising 
this trend. It had a dedicated chapter on ‘Financing Local Government’ which fully embraced 
the view that ‘decentralizing both spending and revenue authority can improve the allocation 
of resources in the public sector by linking the costs and benefits of local public services 
more closely’ (World Bank 1988: 154). 
The promises of decentralisation are both economic and political in nature (Bahl and 
Martinez-Vazquez 2007). The standard economic argument is that sub-national 
governments, being closer to the local community, are more responsive to citizens’ needs 
and better placed to understand their preferences. Therefore the devolution of powers to the 
sub-national level would bring gains in terms of allocative efficiency: resources are spent 
more efficiently when they are allocated at the local level, since decisions would be more in 
line with the community’s preferences (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006; Bird 1990; Tanzi 
1996). This is particularly the case for matters that directly affect communities that are 
geographically well defined. For example, it makes more sense to decentralise the function 
of garbage collection, which affects the community where the service is provided, than 
national defence, which affects all citizens regardless of their location.  
On the political side, autonomous local governments are expected to contribute to 
democratic development and local accountability. The relation between revenue generation 
and state building, argued by scholars at the national level (Brautigam, Fjeldstad and Moore 
2008; Moore 1998), is likely to be stronger at the local level due to the higher proximity of 
political elites to the population (Fjeldstad 2001a). If local governments can take decisions on 
both spending and revenue that are publicly attributable to them, they should be more 
accountable to their citizens (Bird 2011; Bird and Smart 2002). In functioning electoral 
systems, citizens are able to reward or sanction them through their vote. In such contexts, 
local governments would then be more likely to consult their constituencies, therefore making 
political processes more participatory and ultimately benefiting the development process 
more generally (Olowu and Smoke 1992). In multi-party democracies, politicians’ survival is 
dependent on the vote, therefore giving them an incentive to care about distributive justice 
rather than allocating all benefits to a handful of political friends or powerful elites. Therefore, 
in principle, decentralisation should improve distributional outcomes at the local level 
(Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006; Bird 2011; Tanzi 1996). Other possible advantages of 
decentralisation underlined by scholars are related, for example, to the generation of 
information in the relation between the centre and local governments, which in turn may 
contribute to increasing transparency more generally (Bird 1990). Whether these theoretical 
benefits are achieved in practice is an open question that this paper aims to address.  
Despite agreement on ‘the case for decentralisation’, critics expressed doubts even at a 
relatively early stage of this debate. More than questioning decentralisation in general, they 
underlined the need to think carefully about what functions to decentralise, at what level of 
government, and in which sectors (Prud’homme 1995). In particular, some functions may 
naturally belong to the central state, such as redistribution and macroeconomic stabilisation 
(Dixit and Londregan 1998; Bird 1990; Fjeldstad 2001a). As far as redistribution is 
concerned, Prud’homme (1995) notes that if it is entirely left to sub-national governments ‘the 
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poor in well-off regions will fare better than the poor in more deprived regions’. This is not a 
desirable outcome, as in principle every person in a country should have equal opportunities 
and access to basic services regardless of the geographical location. Therefore, while there 
may be a small role for local governments, it is fairly established that redistribution is 
primarily the mandate of the central government (Bird 2011; Dixit and Londregan 1998; 
Fjeldstad and Heggstad 2012; Fjeldstad 2001a). Regarding macroeconomic stabilisation, 
decentralisation may represent a threat if large deficits are generated at the local level. It is 
almost universally the case in all decentralised countries that local expenditures are larger 
than locally generated revenues (Bird 2011; Fjeldstad 2001a; World Bank 1988), so that local 
governments are usually highly reliant on transfers from the centre. If the national 
government acts as a lender of last resort, local deficits can potentially undermine debt 
sustainability and affect inflation at the national level (Bird 2011; Fjeldstad and Heggstad 
2012; Tanzi 1996). More generally, early observers accept that decentralisation may make 
macroeconomic management more difficult due to the challenge of coordinating the different 
levels of sub-national government (Bird 1990; Fjeldstad 2001a; Prud’homme 1995).  
In addition to these potential dangers of decentralisation, devolving functions away from the 
centre is likely to imply a loss of economies of scale (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006). These 
losses may be further amplified by administrative inefficiencies that are typically more acute 
at the local level than at the centre, particularly in developing countries (Fjeldstad and 
Heggstad 2012; Prud’homme 1995; Smoke 1993; Tanzi 1996). Finally, there is an inherent 
tension between the central and local governments, which is both a matter of political 
alignment and of coordination of decision-making across different communities (Bardhan and 
Mookherjee 2006). While some level of autonomy is desirable and inherent in the very 
process of decentralisation, a common concern of central governments is to ensure that 
lower tiers do not fall too much out of line (Bird 1990). One way of dealing with this is 
monitoring performance with respect to certain objectives, for example in the area of 
education or health. However these controls can sometimes fall into political patronage 
(Brollo, Nannicini, Perotti and Tabellini 2013; Olowu and Smoke 1992).  
Ultimately, whether the promises or the dangers of decentralisation prevail, is an empirical 
question and its answer depends on the specific context and on the way in which such a 
process is implemented (Bird 1990; Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006; Fjeldstad and Heggstad 
2012; Smoke 2013). Bird (1990) importantly noted that ‘the structure of government in any 
country largely reflects its history’, an idea also shared elsewhere in the literature (Bird 2011; 
McLure 2001; Smoke 2013). As underlined by several authors, successful decentralisation 
requires a number of prerequisites that are often lacking in developing countries, such as an 
educated and politically aware citizenry, the prevalence of law and order, the conduct of free 
and fair elections, effective electoral competition, and reliable information channels, amongst 
others (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006; Prud’homme 1995). Moreover, central governments 
may have political motivations to prevent true autonomy at the local level (Olowu and Smoke 
1992; Smoke 1993), thus practically impairing success even in a well-designed 
decentralisation process. The way the different levels of government interact will have 
implications on redistributive outcomes (Dixit and Londregan 1998).  
Against this background, this paper provides a review of the existing debates and evidence 
on decentralisation, with a particular focus on the revenue side. The paper’s objective is 
twofold. Firstly, it aims to review the main issues to be considered in the design of local 
revenues. After an overview of the general challenges and opportunities in section 2.1, these 
are illustrated more specifically in the case of three key revenue sources for local 
governments in developing countries: property taxes (section 2.2), intergovernmental 
transfers (section 2.3) and natural resource revenues (section 2.4). Second, it takes a more 
practical view on decentralisation by asking whether fiscal decentralisation is associated with 
better economic and political outcomes (respectively, sections 3.2 and 3.3). In addition, 
section 3.4 explores the revenue mix and the interaction between sources of revenue, such 
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as local taxes and transfers. By doing this, this paper aims to take stock of the existing body 
of knowledge on decentralisation, as well as practical experiences in the developing world. 
Section 4 concludes by offering some initial assessment of whether decentralisation 
delivered, in practice, on its theoretical promises.  
2 Local revenue design: opportunities and 
challenges 
The word ‘decentralisation’ has been widely used to describe the transfer of powers and 
functions from central governments to sub-national levels. Almost invariably the process 
involves the (re)organisation of a government in multiple levels, usually comprising a national 
government, a state or province level, and a town or municipality level (Bird 1990). In 
practice, however, the concept of decentralisation has a number of nuances that it is useful 
to clarify at the outset, as they will be relevant throughout the discussion. These nuances can 
be broadly summarised as follows (Martinez-Vazquez, McClure and Vaillancourt 2006; Tanzi 
1996):  
 Deconcentration is the transfer of decision-making power to central government offices 
located at the sub-national level, within parameters specified by the central government.  
 Delegation is the transfer of the function of service delivery to the sub-national level, but 
the central government retains responsibility for it and for revenue-raising activities. It is 
essentially an administrative decentralisation.  
 Devolution is the transfer of responsibilities for service delivery and some forms of 
revenue collection. It is a type of decentralisation that usually involves political and fiscal 
aspects.  
In this paper, and in the broader economic literature, the word decentralisation usually 
means devolution (Martinez-Vazquez et al. 2006). However, even when a system is 
designed to devolve powers and responsibilities, its implementation in a particular country 
context may result in a scenario where the government has little room for manoeuvre – more 
similar to delegation or administrative decentralisation. Understanding the nuances in the 
concept of decentralisation is therefore crucial in the analysis of its effects because the 
degree and type of responsibility transferred to the local government would imply different 
potential effects on political and economic outcomes, as it will emerge clearly from the 
following discussion.  
2.1 Revenue assignment 
Experts in fiscal decentralisation often refer to the ‘revenue assignment problem’ to indicate 
the set of government decisions on the distribution of revenue-raising responsibilities across 
levels of government (Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez 2007; Martinez-Vazquez et al. 2006). It 
includes both the choice of which taxes to assign at which level, as well as what functions 
and aspects of decision-making to devolve. For example, the local government may 
administer the property tax and decide what rates to apply; however there may be a case for 
the definition of the tax base and its actual assessment to be centralised, to ensure 
coordination and to avoid distortions.  
To a certain extent, decisions on revenue assignment depend on expenditure assignment 
(Bird 2011; Martinez-Vazquez et al. 2006). For example, if the local government is only 
responsible for managing minor local services, such as garbage collection or support for 
local markets, the revenue assignment problem is relatively simple. Instead if it is responsible 
for delivering important public services such as health or education, more substantial 
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resources should be made available at the local level. These would normally include both 
locally-levied taxes and intergovernmental transfers, which imply some sort of formula for 
sharing central resources amongst local governments. The question on expenditure 
assignment is therefore somehow a precondition for revenue assignment decisions and it is 
briefly discussed in the next paragraph.  
In thinking about expenditure assignment, it is useful to consider what functions should be 
transferred to the local level. Generally the objectives of governments, and more specifically 
of public finance, fall into three broad categories: equity through redistribution, efficiency in 
the allocation of resources, and stabilisation (Bird 2011; Fjeldstad 2001a; Martinez-Vazquez 
et al. 2006). On the one hand, as discussed in section 1, redistribution and stabilisation are 
normally in the mandate of the central government, although a role exists for the sub-national 
level in ensuring an equitable distribution of resources. On the other hand, it has been 
argued that local governments can be particularly active in the area of efficient allocation of 
resources, since they are better placed to respond to the preferences and needs of local 
communities (see section 1). This is often referred to as the principle of subsidiarity, whereby 
public services should be delivered by the ‘lowest level of government compatible with the 
size of the benefit area associated with those services’ (Martinez-Vazquez et al. 2006). 
However even within the domain of efficient allocation of resources, there is potentially a 
great degree of variation in the scope of services and responsibilities allocated at the local 
level. The final outcome of the expenditure assignment decision is likely to be determined not 
only by objectives of efficient allocation of functions, but also by considerations of national 
unity and ethnic diversity, by political factors and, importantly, by the existing situation in the 
country considered (Bird 2011; Tanzi 1996).  
Similarly, revenue assignment is determined by a variety of factors, including objective 
principles and more subjective preferences that central governments may have on power 
sharing. There are a number of principles in assigning revenues at the sub-national level, 
which can also be seen as desirable characteristics of local taxes. The following list is 
proposed by Smoke (2013) but these principles are widely accepted amongst experts (see 
for example Bird (2011), Fjeldstad (2001a) and Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez 2007).  
 Adequacy follows directly from the discussion on expenditure, and it requires local 
revenues to be adequate to cover the sub-national budgetary needs.  
 Buoyancy refers to the extent to which the tax yield increases with growth in the economy 
and expenditure needs. Ideally the two sides of the budget should grow at least 
proportionally.  
 Stability is required for local government to make plans and provide services, which 
would be undermined by volatile revenues that fluctuate often and in unpredictable ways.  
 Efficiency regards the minimisation of distortions in the economy and the need to keep a 
proportionate relation between taxes and benefits, in the form of public services.  
 Equity should be ensured both horizontally (across similar individuals) and vertically 
(amongst different groups, for example in terms of income).  
 Autonomy denotes the ability of local governments to make decisions and to take 
responsibility on local tax matters.  
 Administrative feasibility indicates the need to make revenue collection responsibilities 
proportionate to the administrative capacity of the local government.  
 Political feasibility captures the extent to which a tax is likely to be accepted by the 
citizenry, and in what form.  
 Integration/consistency relates to the need for all local taxes to make sense in the context 
of the national fiscal system.  
In practice a tax that satisfies these principles should be levied on a base that is relatively 
immobile, for example property rather than labour. If the tax base can move between one 
area and another, the tax will create economic distortions, encourage aggressive 
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competition, and generate imbalances across regions – thus going against the efficiency and 
equity principles. The issue of mobility is related to spillover effects and externalities. In the 
presence of large externalities or spillover effects to other jurisdictions, public functions may 
be better assigned to the central level or at least they should be closely coordinated by the 
central government (Martinez-Vazquez et al. 2006). A similar case could be made for tax 
bases that are unequally distributed across a country, such as wealth or income, which 
should be taxed centrally to ensure redistribution and regional equality (Fjeldstad 2001a).  
Since taxes should be proportionate to the benefits from public services (the principle of 
adequacy), it is important to make sure that the jurisdiction where the revenue is generated is 
the same as the one where the service is required. So for example if someone generates an 
income in jurisdiction A but has her primary residency in jurisdiction B, taxing her income in A 
will create a disconnection between revenues and expenditures. This is obviously not a 
problem for a single individual, but it can imply a substantial shift of resources away from 
where they are needed if a similar situation applies to a large group of people. This is one of 
the reasons why it is generally agreed that local taxes should focus more on consumption 
rather than income, as the former indicates more accurately the location where the public 
services are required (Martinez-Vazquez et al. 2006).  
The discussion so far suggests that there are three types of revenues that are particularly 
suitable to be transferred at the local level: property taxes; fees, licences and user charges; 
and some indirect taxes. Property taxes are the most important source of revenue for local 
governments worldwide (Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez 2007; Moore 2013) and section 2.2 is 
dedicated specifically to them. Fees, licences, and user charges are typically levied on very 
specific and localised services, such as markets, slaughter houses, parking, and registration 
of motor vehicles (Fjeldstad 2001a; Smoke 1993). They are therefore clearly related to a 
specific benefit or public service, which would normally be provided in a well-defined 
geographical area. Finally some specific indirect taxes can be transferred to the local level, 
and this is particularly the case for excises and some ‘sin’ or ‘bads’ taxes applied for example 
to lotteries, betting, or motor fuels (Fjeldstad 2001a). However, for redistributive reasons, the 
bulk of indirect taxes would still be the responsibility of the central government as it is argued 
for example in the case of value added tax (VAT) (Bird 2011; Fjeldstad 2001a). Indeed, 
consumption is likely to be distributed highly unevenly across a country  higher in large 
urban areas and lower in rural areas with a high prevalence of subsistence agriculture. In 
addition, the national government normally retains control over trade taxes (a major source of 
revenue for many developing countries) and income taxes. However, sub-national 
governments can apply a ‘piggyback’ tax added to the national personal income tax and 
sometimes also to excises that are set centrally (Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez 2007; Bird 
2011).  
Even when all the principles for revenue assignment are taken into account, it is important to 
ensure that the political responsibility for local taxes is transferred together with 
administrative functions. In the words of Martinez-Vazquez et al. (2006: 21), ‘if fiscal 
decentralization is to be a reality, sub-national governments must control their own sources 
of revenue’. This view, which is widely shared by experts (see for example Bird 2011), 
suggests that if decentralisation is to deliver on its promises, it must be a true 
decentralisation rather than just deconcentration or delegation. In practice this means that 
local governments must be allowed by law to set key tax parameters, most importantly the 
marginal tax rate, and they should be clearly seen by citizens as responsible for local taxes 
(Bird 2011; Martinez-Vazquez et al. 2006). This would trigger incentives for local officials to 
show that they are providing benefits and services in return for tax payments, thus 
establishing a relation of accountability with the citizens and sowing the seeds for a social 
contract. In many developing countries, where the central government has a strong 
leadership and sub-national governments are not very powerful, there may be political 
obstacles to the transfer of power and control over taxes to the local level. This can in some 
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cases be avoided through a good design of revenue assignment responsibilities; but if ‘the 
central government in the end can control the actions of subnational governments, those 
governments may for most purposes be considered to be more agents of the central 
government than independent actors’ (Bird 1990: 281). 
2.2 Property taxes 
Having in mind the list of principles for a good local tax, it is not very surprising that the 
property tax is the main source of local financing in many countries as it satisfies almost all 
these principles – at least potentially. Provided that administrative constraints can somehow 
be relaxed, it is certainly true that this tax could potentially generate sufficient amounts of 
resources to meet the principle of adequacy. In addition, it is a particularly stable source of 
revenue, as the tax base would not vary much at times of crisis or economic downturn. This 
feature, however, also means that the property tax is not typically buoyant with respect to 
economic growth: it does not grow automatically with economic growth or income. This is a 
particularly undesirable feature for local governments as they would have to go back to 
voters for consultation to increase rates or reassess properties if they want to achieve 
revenue increases. Moreover, by being levied on a rather immobile base, it prevents 
competition amongst regions. The property tax also benefits from rather low competition from 
higher levels of government, that are typically willing to leave it to the sub-national level. 
While this can be partly explained by the fact that the proximity to communities and land 
makes it easier for lower-tier governments to assess and manage the tax, it can also be due, 
from a cynical viewpoint, to the unpopularity that this tax usually faces (Bahl and Martinez-
Vazquez 2007).  
Importantly, the property tax can ensure a relatively good correspondence between tax 
payments and benefits. It is plausible that businesses and residential owners will perceive a 
benefit from public services, such as policing, street lighting and garbage collection that is 
proportionate to the value of their properties. In this sense, the property tax can be 
considered a ‘rough kind of benefit charge’ (Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez 2007: 3). It follows 
that it is vertically equitable since real estate, particularly in developing countries, is typically 
concentrated amongst wealthy landlords. Since the richest segments of society are usually 
better positioned to avoid or evade income taxes (see for example Fairfield and Jorratt 
2014), the property tax can also play a role in redistributing the tax burden. This, of course, is 
true unless exemptions and preferences are granted (formally or informally) to the well-off to 
ensure political support. For example, Fjeldstad and Heggstad (2012) report that exemptions 
and political interference in collections are common in Anglophone Africa.  
Due to these benefits, the property tax is generally recognised as the ideal local tax. It 
represented over 2 per cent of GDP in OECD countries in the 2000s, reaching 34 per cent 
of GDP in the US and Canada, but only 0.60 per cent in developing and emerging countries 
(Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez 2007). Despite its low share of GDP, the property tax 
represents an important portion of local revenues. Bird (2011) shows that in most 
decentralised states it is mostly levied at the state or local level, while income and indirect 
taxes are levied mostly at the central level. Bird and Slack (2006) report that ‘property taxes 
accounted for 40 percent of all sub-national taxes in developing countries and 35 percent (up 
from 30 percent in earlier decades) in developed countries’ (Bird and Slack 2006: 8). 
However, this share is lower in Africa, despite widespread reforms in the past two decades 
that introduced the property tax in most countries. In that context, it is normally a local tax 
levied mostly on urban properties, while rural areas are often exempted (exceptions are 
South Africa and Namibia) (Fjeldstad and Heggstad 2012).  
It is therefore clear that this tax has an important role to play in local revenue generation. 
However, it is still underused in developing and emerging countries for two main reasons: 
administrative and political constraints (Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez 2007; Fjeldstad and 
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Heggstad 2012). First, since property taxes are usually not self-assessed, all the 
administrative burden falls on local administrations that already face severe capacity 
constraints. Administration of this tax requires relatively high costs related to information-
gathering, assessment, and register-keeping, particularly when introducting the tax or during 
reassessments. The problems related to valuation may lead to a perception of inequality in 
the system, in turn creating compliance problems. Moreover, they make revenues even less 
elastic, as the tax base does not follow growth in the value of properties unless they are 
regularly re-evaluated (Fjeldstad and Heggstad 2012). As a result, the revenue yield may 
even be lower than the total costs involved in collection, potentially making this tax 
unattractive to local governments. Second, the property tax is particularly unpopular amongst 
taxpayers. Partly, this is due to the fact that it is not related to any earning, like the income 
tax, or easily concealed in prices, like VAT (Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez 2007). Moreover, in 
developing countries property owners may exert stronger resistance to paying a tax for which 
they see few benefits in return, particularly where housing conditions are poor and basic 
services are not provided extensively (Fjeldstad and Heggstad 2012).  
Despite the importance of property tax, it is useful to put it in the more general perspective of 
local revenue generation. While the property tax accounts for 40 per cent of local taxes, it 
covers only 10 per cent of local government expenditure (Bird and Slack 2006). These 
numbers suggest the presence of a large gap between taxes and expenditure, which is filled 
almost exclusively by intergovernmental transfers.1 In fact several authors (see for example 
Fjeldstad and Heggstad 2012; Martinez-Vazquez et al. 2006; Tanzi 1996) noted that if the 
standard principles for efficient revenue assignment are followed (see section 2.1), not much 
would be left for sub-national governments to raise in tax revenue. The largest sources of tax 
revenue in developing countries, namely trade and indirect taxes on goods and services, are 
levied exclusively (in the former case) or mostly (in the latter) at the central level. The 
problem is even deeper in developing countries, which normally ‘err on the conservative side 
and assign fewer revenue sources than could be justified by fiscal federalism principles’ 
(Smoke 2013: 5). As a result, in almost all decentralised states, and particularly in developing 
countries, transfers are essential.  
2.3 Intergovernmental transfers 
In the words of Bird (1990: 278), ‘money is at the heart of intergovernmental matters in all 
countries’. Therefore the way in which local revenues, including transfers, are designed and 
implemented can tell a lot about the nature and quality of relations between the centre and 
the local level. Intergovernmental relations involve a variety of actors. The obvious ones are 
the central and sub-national governments, where the latter usually involve multiple levels. A 
variety of approaches to the intergovernmental distribution of power is possible, ranging from 
a complete empowerment of local governments where they are able to set their own tax 
systems; to a situation where most taxes are collected centrally, with some portion of them 
shared at the local level and very few options for local revenue generation (Smoke 2013). 
Even when the intergovernmental system is designed to give autonomy to the sub-national 
level, however, this may not translate in practice. Central governments may have an interest 
in exerting more control than necessary, therefore preventing true autonomy (Smoke 2013). 
Moreover, the powers and responsibilities devolved may not be commensurate with the 
administrative and political capacity of local governments. This may result in poor 
implementation, which in turn would undermine the positive political effects that may emerge, 
particularly in terms of accountability. If citizens believe the government is not providing the 
services they need, or not efficiently so, they will be reluctant to pay taxes, and tax collection 
will consequently be more reliant on coercion than on consensus.  
                                               
1  Some sub-national governments are able to count on borrowing, but this is not common practice in many countries and, 
even when they are allowed, loans are strictly capped for reasons related to national macroeconomic stability. 
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While the main relation of interest is the one between the central and local governments, it is 
important to keep in mind that there is a multitude of actors involved. Smoke (2013) provides 
a list of those, which includes:  
local government oversight ministries (Ministry of Local Government, Home Affairs, 
Interior, etc.), coordinating ministries with a broad mandate to oversee an aspect of 
public sector operations (Ministry of Finance, Planning, Civil Service, etc.), special 
purpose ministries (Ministry of Rural Development, Urban Development, Special Areas, 
etc.) and ministries involved in service delivery (education, health, transport, etc.). 
(Smoke 2013: 10) 
On the one hand, the involvement of central government agencies and ministries is 
necessary to ensure the coordination and consistency of local policies in the context of 
broader, national plans. On the other hand, even if all these actors were willing to cooperate 
with local governments, they may not be well coordinated, therefore creating a potentially 
large administrative burden for local governments.  
As far as intergovernmental transfers are concerned, design issues mostly revolve around 
addressing vertical and horizontal imbalances. Vertical imbalance refers to the 
correspondence between spending responsibilities and available revenues at all levels of 
government. Since tax revenues typically only cover a portion of local expenditures in 
developing countries, transfers play a crucial role in ensuring vertical equity. Horizontal 
imbalance refers to equity in the distribution of resources amongst governments at the same 
level in different regions. Vertical equity considerations determine how much of the centrally 
collected revenue should be redistributed at the sub-national level, while horizontal equity 
considerations influence the formula used to share revenues across regions.  
Considerations on vertical and horizontal equity are therefore at the core of the 
intergovernmental distribution of resources, which is typically regulated by a pre-set formula. 
Revenue-sharing formulas establish which taxes are redistributed at which level, through 
fiscal transfers, and by which amount. Such formulas can concern the whole pot of taxes, or 
specific tax types. Both options have been observed in developing and emerging countries. 
For example, Argentina, Brazil, Pakistan, and Russia had experiences with sharing only 
specific tax types (Fjeldstad 2001a). However, this may create distortions as, for example, 
central governments may have an incentive to increase revenues from the source that is not 
shared, to maximise the amount of revenue available to them. Moreover, distortions can be 
introduced if, for example, central governments favour rate increases for taxes that are 
shared sub-nationally rather than taking the most efficient decision on what tax rates to 
increase. For these reasons, the best way to organise revenue-sharing is to decide on a 
percentage of the whole pot of taxes to be shared across levels of government (Bird and 
Smart 2002; Fjeldstad 2001a).  
Furthermore, the formula may imply some degree of conditionality related to local 
performance with respect to specific objectives – typically, the provision of public services 
that are considered essential such as health or education. Whether transfers are conditional 
or unconditional depends on broader objectives, but also on the political preferences of the 
central government and particularly the degree of control that it wants to keep over resources 
that are redistributed locally. Making transfers conditional may be attractive to central 
governments, to ensure coordination and national coherence as well as political control. If 
central control is so tight that the survival of local governments is conditional on approval 
from the centre, clientelistic intergovernmental relations may emerge. This would result in 
making local governments accountable to national political leaders, rather than to local 
taxpayers, therefore breaking the accountability link that is at the core of the potential political 
benefits of decentralisation.  
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There are also other, more technical, challenges that make full conditionality even less 
feasible and desirable. Put simply, the problem is that a region may perform poorly, for 
example in terms of access to basic services, precisely because it is underfunded. Transfers 
should take into account this possibility and still be available in poor regions despite poor 
performance. One of the ways to overcome this problem is to design matching grants with 
variable rates according to income levels (Bird and Smart 2002). This implies that a poor 
region with low income would be required to contribute a smaller proportion of public 
investments in, say, health, than a region with higher income. In other words, ‘the matching 
rate faced by any particular locality for any particular program should therefore be higher the 
greater the degree of central interest and the lower the (expected) degree of local 
enthusiasm (price elasticity) and ability (income elasticity) to support the program’ (Bird and 
Smart 2002: 905). While Northern countries such as the US and Canada have experimented 
with this type of matching grants, there are few good examples from developing countries. 
This is most likely due to the high information requirement that a good matching grant design 
requires, which is normally unavailable in developing countries.  
Because of these difficulties, most developing countries adopt some form of block grant that 
is distributed to sub-national governments according to a formula that takes into account both 
expenditure needs and fiscal capacity (Fjeldstad 2001a). However, unconditional block 
grants clearly create a problem of incentives, since the availability of resources from the 
centre results in a soft budget constraint at the local level (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006; 
Bird 2011). If the amount of transfers is decided ex post, any government would have the 
incentive to overspend and undertax. In this way, it would obtain citizens’ approval for 
delivering services to the community without having to pay the political cost deriving from tax 
collection. Instead, the resources needed to cover expenses would come from taxation in 
other regions or from centrally collected taxes, for example on international trade. A way to 
make the budget constraint ‘harder’ is to decide ex ante the amount of transfer, according to 
a set formula based on characteristics that are not immediately manipulable by the local 
government, such as the region’s population. While this type of formula helps in bringing 
some fiscal discipline to local governments, it is far from being a comprehensive solution.  
The key remaining issue is information (Bordignon, Manasse amd Tabellini 2001), 
particularly with respect to the assessment of fiscal capacity. The central government does 
not have all the necessary information on local tax bases to be able to separate poor regions 
with a small tax base (and therefore low tax revenues) from regions with larger tax bases but 
less enforcement (therefore appearing to have equally low tax revenues). Bordignon et al. 
(2001) show that a possible solution, at least theoretically, is to use the tax rate as a proxy 
for the size of the tax base and of the effort the government is making to collect taxes. The 
authors argue that if tax revenue is more valuable for a poor region, which may be plausible 
given the overall lower level of basic services, tax effort will be relatively cheaper. They show 
that if this is the case, a poor region would impose a higher tax rate while a relatively richer 
region would prefer a lower rate, therefore revealing the true size of their tax base despite 
information asymmetries. The argument holds in theory, but it is unclear whether it can be 
applied in the complex reality of a developing country.  
In a way, transfers can be seen as an unearned source of revenue, as opposed to taxation 
that can be considered earned. On the one hand, in the case of taxation, local governments 
need to make the organisational effort to collect revenues and they have to engage in a 
reciprocal relation with citizens where they extract taxes in exchange for public services 
(Fjeldstad 2002). In this sense, taxation is earned because it has a clear administrative and 
political cost attached to it. On the other hand, transfers do not depend on this reciprocal 
relation with citizens, and in this sense they are unearned. Instead, they are provided 
according to a formula that cannot always take into account performance, or at least not fully, 
as discussed above.  
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2.4 Natural resource revenue 
Natural resources can be considered as another source of unearned revenue since 
governments can benefit from it without having to engage in a reciprocal relation of 
accountability with citizens. The standard revenue assignment principles imply that natural 
resource revenues should be collected by the central government rather than at the sub-
national level (Bird 2011; Fjeldstad 2001a). This is mainly justified by the fact that natural 
wealth is usually distributed unevenly across the national territory, making the intervention of 
the national government necessary to ensure some form of redistribution. Therefore, natural 
resource revenues usually reach sub-national governments in the form of transfers from the 
centre, and as such they are subject to the same issues of incentives and asymmetric 
information discussed in the previous section. These issues will not be repeated here. 
Instead, this section focuses on additional considerations that are specific to the distribution 
and management of natural resources at the sub-national level.2  
Whether natural resources can produce positive economic and political outcomes is an open 
question and it depends on both the way in which revenues are extracted, and how they are 
redistributed at the national level. What is most relevant for decentralisation is the latter 
issue, on redistribution of resources. Arellano-Yanguas and Mejia-Acosta (2014) argue that 
the redistribution rules for natural resources depend both on economic and technical issues, 
as well as political issues. As far as the latter is concerned, they underline the importance of 
two dimensions in particular: the extent to which local actors are connected to national 
politics, and the degree of bargaining power that they have.  
As in the case of intergovernmental transfers, the distribution of natural resource revenue at 
the sub-national level involves decisions on both vertical and horizontal equity. Let’s start 
from the vertical dimension and the specific considerations needed in the case of natural 
resources. On the one hand, some types of natural resource revenues, such as royalties, are 
dependent on international commodity prices and therefore suffer from high volatility. So 
there would be a case for the centralisation of such revenues to protect local governments 
from volatile revenues that may make their budgets vulnerable to broader international 
dynamics and unsustainable. Instead, central governments can rely on various forms of 
stabilisation at the national level, such as stabilisation funds and a more flexible use of 
borrowing. On the other hand, it is desirable to share some portion of revenues with sub-
national governments to satisfy their demands for participation in the benefits from resource 
wealth and to compensate producing regions from possible losses and negative externalities.  
Interestingly, Arellano-Yanguas and Mejia-Acosta (2014) show that the fact a state is unitary 
or federal does not necessarily have implications for the extent of decentralisation of natural 
resource revenues. Federal countries like Mexico decentralise fewer revenues than unitary 
states like Bolivia and Peru. However, certainly federal states are better positioned to 
manage such decentralisation, along the lines of existing federal structures. Another 
interesting finding from the same authors is that unitary states tend to decentralise at the 
municipality level, while federal ones do so at the state or region level. This is consistent with 
a broader political argument in fiscal decentralisation, whereby centralised states favour 
transferring resources to the lowest levels of government because they usually are not 
powerful enough to represent a serious challenge at the national level.  
The horizontal dimension is linked closely with the losses and externalities from extraction 
activities. Indeed, the key issue here is whether to redistribute revenues to all regions or just 
to those that produce the natural resource. The case for focusing only on producing regions 
is based on the idea that they should be compensated for the loss of non-renewable assets 
and for possible negative externalities due to the presence of extractive operations. In 
                                               
2  This section draws largely from the comprehensive work of Arellano-Yanguas and Mejia-Acosta (2014). 
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addition, producing regions can demand more revenue to finance the necessary 
infrastructure and public services required to support the extractive sector, as its presence 
may put additional pressure on already constrained local administrations. However, focusing 
only on producing regions has at least two problems. First, it is likely to create grievances 
amongst regions that do not produce natural resources but still feel entitled to their share of 
national wealth. Second, it may be difficult to limit the losses and externalities from extraction 
clearly along the lines of existing jurisdictions. A neighbouring region that is not producing 
natural resources may still have to provide services to allow the extractive sector to work 
properly and it may still be affected in terms of, for example, prices and labour market 
dynamics. Ideally, the central government would quantify externalities and feed a measure of 
these into a sharing formula. However, information problems are again at work, and make 
this very difficult in practice. Different countries have adopted different solutions: Peru 
redistributes only to producing regions, Brazil shares resources also with regions that provide 
essential services to the extractive sector, and Colombia has a mixed system where all sub-
national governments get some share of total revenues (Arellano-Yanguas and Mejia-Acosta 
2014).  
3 What do we know? The practice of fiscal 
decentralisation in developing countries 
The discussion so far has focused on the theoretical promises of fiscal decentralisation and 
on how different sources of revenue can be designed to bring about potential political and 
economic benefits, as well as to overcome potential challenges. If a system is well designed 
there are, in principle, great gains to be obtained from fiscal decentralisation. For example, 
local taxes may trigger virtuous circles of social accountability; the decentralisation of tax and 
expenditure may result in efficiency gains since fiscal choices would be more aligned with 
citizens’ preferences; and local political institutions can be strengthened by being 
empowered with new functions and responsibilities. However, even if such positive effects 
are plausible in theory, do they occur in practice? 
A recent paper argues that the theory and practice of fiscal decentralisation are out of sync 
(Smoke 2013). This is not because policymakers in developing countries ignore the wealth of 
literature on revenue and expenditure assignment or the standard principles of fiscal 
decentralisation. On the contrary, these principles are generally followed in practice and it is 
very rare to observe an inappropriate allocation of revenue across levels of government. 
Instead, the reasons for the gap between theory and practice are more nuanced and 
complex. Although generalisations are difficult to make, the following factors can, in different 
combinations, contribute to explaining the practice of decentralisation (Smoke 2013: 823):  
 National political economy. Decentralisation is a highly political, as well as technical, 
process. History and politics influence both its design and implementation, thus 
contributing to success or failure.  
 National bureaucratic environment. A multitude of ministries and agencies are typically 
involved in decentralisation and they should not only be engaged but also coordinated to 
ensure positive outcomes.  
 Sub-national political dynamics and accountability. Electoral and non-electoral relations 
of accountability and political power dynamics are essential to understanding outcomes 
from decentralisation. For example, the presence of political capture and powerful elites 
may result in distortions and inequalities; while the degree of awareness and interest of 
citizens affects political participation.  
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 Capacity and leadership matter greatly. However, it is important to understand the 
nuances of where capacity is needed (for example: valuations or actual collections of 
property tax?) and what type (classroom-type or hands-on?).  
 Lack of strategic orientation in decentralisation and fiscal reform programmes, in the 
sense that not enough attention is paid to how reforms are implemented in technical, 
political, and institutional terms.  
These factors are largely confirmed in the empirical studies reviewed in this section. 
Although this literature is very large, most studies are largely anecdotal and cannot offer solid 
and rigorous evidence. Therefore, before going into the details of the empirical results, 
section 3.1 provides an overview of the main methodological challenges encountered in the 
empirical literature. Against that background, and keeping in mind these caveats, sections 
3.2 and 3.3 review the existing evidence to highlight the critical elements of success or 
failure, without aiming to be fully comprehensive.3 The outcomes of interest are divided in 
two broad categories: (1) public service delivery and other economic outcomes, such as 
inequality and poverty reduction; and (2) political outcomes, related to accountability and 
intergovernmental political dynamics. Clearly, however, this distinction is somewhat fictitious 
since economic and political aspects coexist and are closely interrelated in practice. In 
addition, section 3.4 looks at the interaction of various sources of local revenue and how it 
can affect the effectiveness of fiscal decentralisation.  
3.1 Methods and challenges in empirical research 
In an ideal world, studies on the impact of fiscal decentralisation would compare two 
situations, one with decentralisation and one without, with identical conditions otherwise. For 
example, researchers may want to analyse a country before and after decentralisation 
occurred, but where all other conditions have remained the same. Or, they may compare two 
countries that are very similar under all other circumstances, except that one is decentralised 
and the other is not. However, these ideal settings are hardly ever found in practice. Policy 
changes do not occur in isolation from other country-level developments, and countries are 
different in a number of ways. Therefore, researchers have to work creatively to approach as 
much as possible these ideal conditions, while still working in environments where multiple 
confounding factors coexist. In doing so, they face at least three sets of obstacles.  
First, there is no uniform measure of decentralisation. Some studies use the ratio of local tax 
to total regional revenues (Caldeira, Foucault and Rota-Graziosi 2012), most use share of 
sub-national expenditure over total government spending (Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez 
2011), while others use both (Sow and Razafimahefa 2015). Although these measures are 
closely related, they capture different aspects of decentralisation. In some cases, the 
preference for one measure is clearly stated according to the study’s objective. For example, 
studies looking at decentralisation’s effects on the efficiency of public service delivery may 
find it more relevant to use the expenditure ratio. However, the share of decentralised 
expenditure is not necessarily a measure of how autonomous local governments are in 
making decisions on these expenditures. Therefore it does not necessarily give us 
information about the nature, quality, and effectiveness of decentralisation, as recognised by 
some authors (Faguet 2008; Ivanyna and Shah 2010; Tranchant 2008). A detailed 
discussion about potential measures of decentralisation and what they can or cannot capture 
can be found in Ivanyna and Shah (2010). On the other hand, revenue decentralisation is 
more indicative of fiscal autonomy, and is therefore expected to be closely related to 
accountability and responsiveness (Caldeira et al. 2012; Sow and Razafimahefa 2015). 
These challenges make it difficult to ensure that the chosen measure actually captures the 
intended process, and not broader political dynamics. Moreover, the use of different 
                                               
3  A more comprehensive list of sources is reported in the Bibliography for the interested reader.  
18 
measures in the literature sometimes prevents the comparison of specific results across 
studies.  
Second, it is very hard to establish relations of causality from decentralisation to specific 
economic or political outcomes. In comparing communes or countries, it is generally the case 
that richer areas have higher levels of public services, higher fiscal autonomy (local taxes) 
and are generally wealthier. Across countries, high-income countries are typically more 
decentralised and have bigger governments than low-income countries. All these conditions 
occur at the same time, making it difficult to establish clear causal links between two specific 
aspects. In addition, pre-reform conditions, such as income per capita or the size of 
government, influence the potential impact of decentralisation, since there may be a 
minimum level of administrative and physical local infrastructure needed to reap its benefits. 
Quantitative studies address this issue with the inclusion of control variables, instrumental 
variables or other econometric methods such as GMM or fixed-effects panel data models 
(Caldeira et al. 2012; Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez 2011; Tranchant 2008). Despite the 
value of these techniques, often the econometric results are still not beyond doubt. 
Qualitative research can use comparative case studies to identify impacts of decentralisation, 
or to disentangle what the factors are that prevent or ensure that such impacts would occur. 
Although they can offer important lessons (Faguet 2008), these studies are still largely 
descriptive and do not necessarily address causality in a conclusive way. Moreover, 
decentralisation is likely to have indirect effects through the macroeconomic and institutional 
environment, that interacts in various ways with pre-existing conditions and with more direct 
outcomes. In fact, rather than looking for decentralisation’s effects on institutions, it should be 
recognised that decentralisation is an institutional reform in itself and the manifestation of an 
institutional process that spans long before and after the actual decision to decentralise 
(Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez 2011).  
Last but not least, adequate data to underpin rigorous analysis are not always available. 
Clearly, this is a bigger challenge in low-income countries that, as a result, are 
underrepresented in the literature. Moreover, cross-country studies are faced with the 
additional challenge of comparability: data cover different years in different countries, may be 
based on different definitions and may derive from different data collection procedures. While 
country case studies overcome this issue, their results are often difficult to generalise.  
As a result of these challenges, the literature on fiscal decentralisation is relatively scattered 
and piecemeal, while still being quite vast.  
3.2 Service delivery and economic outcomes 
One of the obvious theoretical implications of fiscal decentralisation is that it can improve 
service delivery, since local governments can be more responsive to citizens’ needs and 
preferences. Empirical quantitative studies have looked at whether this occurs in practice or 
not. For example, Reinikka and Svensson (2004) show that Uganda’s public expenditures on 
education were largely captured by local officials and politicians rather than reaching the 
poor. The authors show that only 13 per cent of the central government grant to primary 
schools actually reached these schools. Additionally, the distribution of funds is found to be 
endogenous to the social and political background of the school: those catering for richer 
students can negotiate and obtain greater shares of funding, with obvious equity implications. 
Caselli and Michaels (2013) report similar results in relation to natural resource revenues in 
Brazil. The authors start by showing that oil wealth resulted in higher revenues for 
municipalities that, according to official reports, were reflected in additional spending 
particularly in the following sectors: housing and urban development, transportation, 
education, and health. However, microeconomic data from the Brazilian census reveals that 
this increased spending does not translate into better indicators related to these sectors or in 
income increases. While this may be due to a lag in time for the outcomes to occur, a 
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plausible explanation is that the political elite captures the oil revenues for activities of ‘self-
preservation’ or just to enrich itself. An example of the former is the creation of patronage 
jobs or benefits to allies within the administration, for which the authors provide some 
supportive evidence. The importance of elite capture is also confirmed by Crook and 
Sverisson (2001), showing that positive outcomes are less likely to occur where there is no 
challenge to local power structures, therefore leading to elite capture by a few powerful 
groups rather than broad-based accountability.  
While elite capture may be an explanation for the missing link between resources and 
outcomes, it is also possible that local authorities do not have the necessary administrative 
and political capacity to spend. Or, in the words of Loayza, Rigolini and Calvo-Gonzalez 
(2011), they have ‘more than they can handle’. These authors show that Peruvian 
municipalities struggle to spend the resources that are allocated to them, resulting in low 
execution rates. This is due to factors related to budget size and the allocation process, 
capacity of the municipal administration, local needs, and constraints related to political 
economy considerations. They conclude that decentralisation should focus not only on 
transferring resources, but also on building the necessary technical and political capacity for 
sub-national administrations to be able to handle such responsibilities. Therefore a gradual 
approach to decentralisation may be preferable.  
Other papers tell a more positive story. Litschig (2008), using Brazilian data from the 1980s 
and 1990s, shows that federal transfers had positive effects on the quality of public services 
and particularly on educational attainment. This effect is particularly due to higher teacher-
student ratios in municipal elementary schools.4 The cross-country analysis of Sow and 
Razafimahefa (2015) supports the presence of these beneficial effects on service delivery, 
with three important qualifications. First, the positive impacts can only occur once a basic 
level of public expenditure is already in place, showing a U-shaped relation between fiscal 
decentralisation and the efficiency of public services. Most low-income countries have 
expenditures lower than the necessary level. Second, the political and institutional 
environment influences this relation, both in terms of the level of corruption (negative effect) 
and the degree of autonomy of the local governments (positive effect). Third, revenue 
decentralisation has a positive impact on service delivery in all countries, illustrating the 
importance of transferring both expenditure and revenue responsibilities to the local level.  
As far as Africa is concerned, Maro (1990) shows that in Tanzania decentralisation has been 
associated with positive effects of service delivery. Using data from the 1970s to the mid-
1980s, after Tanzania’s reform of 1972, the author shows that increased expenditure on 
roads, primary education, health, and clean water supplies has led to increased provision of 
these services in rural areas and has reduced the average distance from these facilities. 
However, the provision of services, despite being expanded, does not seem adequate as 
many facilities are shown to lack essential materials, staff and maintenance. This is a 
common feature of many low-income countries, where the overall quantity and quality of 
services provided in poor areas is very low. As a result, citizens are often dissatisfied with 
public services and this, in turn, can be an important factor in promoting tax resistance, as 
shown by Fjeldstad (2001b) for Tanzania. He argues that ‘in circumstances where taxes are 
perceived to be unfair and people receive few tangible benefits in return for taxes paid, we 
may expect that only coercive methods of tax enforcement will generate tax revenues’ 
(Fjeldstad 2001b: 295). Physical coercion to extract taxes can generate conflicts with 
taxpayers, preventing the generation of positive political or economic outcomes. In this 
context, donors can further undermine good governance by focusing on the level of tax 
collection rather than the process by which tax is extracted.  
                                               
4  While this may seem at odds with the results from Caselli and Michaels (2013), it is important to note that this study 
looks at transfers rather than oil revenues, besides using a different sample of local communities in a different 
timeframe. 
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Other potential economic outcomes of decentralisation, such reduced poverty and inequality, 
are closely related with the effectiveness of public services discussed above, since better 
services can be a channel for achieving such outcomes. Steiner (2007) develops a 
conceptual framework for the potential effect of decentralisation on poverty reduction, which 
includes various channels such as efficiency in service delivery due to informational 
advantages of local governments, increased local revenues, and participation. The validity of 
this framework is then tested in the case of Uganda. Confirming the argument of Smoke 
(2013), the author finds that the theory and practice are disconnected, for three main 
reasons. First, the limited level of participation and missed opportunities for dialogue result in 
a lack of information that prevents the potential efficiency gains: the local authorities are not 
connected to the preferences of the people. Second, local capacity and staffing are not 
aligned with responsibilities – an argument that is echoed repeatedly in the literature. Third, 
corruption and patronage, including in the relations with the central government, result in 
decisions being based on political advantage rather than efficiency considerations.  
Crook (2003) largely confirms these results by showing that in several sub-Saharan African 
countries decentralisation has not led to a challenge to local elites that are either indifferent 
to pro-poor policies or reluctant to adopt them. Therefore, political processes both between 
the local government and citizens and between the local and central governments are key to 
obtaining the promised effects of decentralisation on poverty reduction. The author argues 
that:  
the degree of responsiveness to the poor and the extent to which there is any impact 
on poverty are determined primarily by the politics of local-central relations and the 
general regime context – particularly the commitment of the central political authorities 
to poverty reduction.  
(Crook 2003: 77) 
The cross-country analysis of Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez (2011) contributes to this 
negative picture by showing that fiscal decentralisation increases both poverty and inequality. 
However, in the case of inequality, the negative effect becomes smaller with government 
size, eventually turning positive when governments represent at least 20 per cent of GDP. 
After this threshold, decentralisation can reduce inequality. However, as it was the case in 
Sow and Razafimahefa (2015), most developing countries are below this threshold and may 
therefore fail to reap the benefits of decentralisation. Evidence from Benin (Caldeira et al. 
2012) supports the existence of a threshold beyond which decentralisation can help to 
reduce non-monetary poverty through improved access to basic services. Although all 
communes in Benin benefited from better access to drinking water and sanitation systems 
than under the centralised system, the effect of decentralisation on other services was more 
ambiguous. Only wealthier communes reap the full benefits in terms of non-monetary 
poverty, while poorer ones can even experience adverse effects. The latter are shown to 
focus more on basic services, such as drinking water, while neglecting primary education. 
This could potentially perpetuate and even exacerbate inequality in a decentralised system.  
A more positive story can be told for Bolivia and Colombia (Faguet 2008). In both countries, 
moving decision-making from the centre to local governments resulted in a shift of resources 
from infrastructure and economic production to social sectors such as education, water and 
sanitation, and health. Moreover, poorer districts generally received more resources than 
under the centralised system, although overall equality in the distribution of resources 
deteriorated in Colombia. This may be due to a relatively equal distribution of resources 
under the centralised Colombian government, in contrast to the highly unequal pre-reform 
situation in Bolivia. The comparison between these two cases shows that outcomes are 
dependent on the situation preceding the decision to decentralise, including economic and 
political characteristics both at the central and local levels. In both countries local taxes 
increased following decentralisation, though more substantially so in Colombia than in 
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Bolivia. This difference is probably due to the sequencing of reforms that in Colombia 
focused first on local tax capacity and then on further administrative and political 
decentralisation. This allowed Colombian local governments to take additional 
responsibilities in a more gradual and effective way than in Bolivia.  
As far as macroeconomic imbalances are concerned, Faguet (2008) also shows that 
decentralisation in Colombia has contributed to increased debt, fuelled by large borrowing by 
sub-national governments. However, it is difficult to establish causality given other economic 
imbalances occurring in the region at the same time. Still, this illustrates the importance of 
hard budget constraints to maintain fiscal discipline in a decentralised state. The cross-
country analysis of Aldasoro and Seiferling (2014) looks specifically at the relation between 
decentralisation and debt accumulation. The authors show that vertical imbalances in local 
government financing can contribute to increased debt, therefore potentially representing a 
concrete danger of decentralisation.  
3.3 Political outcomes 
The evidence discussed in the previous section not only underlines the importance of 
political factors, but also identifies them as a prerequisite for the realisation of positive 
outcomes in terms of service delivery and poverty reduction. Some of the political aspects of 
local government financing have already emerged, such as the relations with national 
governments and the existing political environment. The following paragraphs review in more 
detail some of the evidence specifically focused on the relation between local revenue and 
political outcomes. The focus is on three interrelated aspects in particular: relations with the 
central government, quality of local institutions and leadership, and accountability.  
First of all, several studies underline the importance of national politics and the relation 
between central and local politicians. Crook and Sverisson (2001) show that in the 
successful case of India (West Bengal), national politicians were highly committed to a pro-
poor strategy and willing to actively support local politicians to achieve it. On the other hand, 
in failed cases like Nigeria and Mexico, central governments used the distribution of 
resources to establish or consolidate patronage relations. This is confirmed in the case of 
Sierra Leone by Jibao and Prichard (2013), who note that ‘the large revenue gains described 
here coincided closely with the emergence of greater support for tax reform at the national 
level’ (Jibao and Prichard 2013: 24). Importantly, national support in Sierra Leone did not 
imply direct interventions or increased resources from the centre, but rather encouragement 
of local governments to overcome tax resistance, though a demonstration effect and non-
interference in local tax efforts. Equally there are examples where the central government’s 
behaviour fuels factors associated with failure, such as patronage and corruption. For 
example Brollo and Nanniccini (2012) show that in Brazil discretional transfers are allocated 
strategically to support mayors that are aligned with the president’s coalition and to punish 
political enemies. Aligned mayors receive approximately one third larger discretionary 
transfers for infrastructural development.  
This finding raises an important question regarding accountability: are local governments 
accountable to their citizens or to higher levels of government? Brollo (2010) shows that in 
the Brazilian case the latter is true. By looking at the release of reports from an anti-
corruption programme, the author shows that municipalities where corruption violations were 
uncovered were punished by the central government with lower transfers. However, the 
central government reduced transfers selectively to non-aligned municipalities, to minimise 
political loss. While mayors who are both aligned with the president and not corrupt are 
rewarded with higher transfers, the central government helps aligned corrupt municipalities to 
go through the punishment process more quickly. The author argues that voters tend to 
punish corrupt politicians only if reports are unveiled no more than six months prior to the 
election. However, lower transfers to corrupt mayors trigger dissatisfaction and compromise 
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their electoral success. Crucially, however, electoral punishment seems to be driven by the 
manipulation of transfers by the central government rather than a reputation effect amongst 
citizens. Juul (2006) confirms this result in the case of Senegal, by showing that local officials 
are primarily accountable to the national party hierarchy rather than to citizens.  
Second, and closely related to the issue of intergovernmental relations, different sources of 
revenue may have different implications in terms of the quality of local institutions. For 
example Brollo et al. (2013) show evidence in favour of a political resource curse where 
windfall resources have adverse effects on corruption and the quality of politicians. The 
authors use data from Brazilian municipalities to show a causal relation from increased 
transfers to higher corruption and to lower quality of political candidates, measured with 
education levels. A larger budget size, thanks to transfers, allows politicians to extract rents 
while still being able to please voters with public expenditure. Therefore, it is harder to detect, 
and thus punish, bad politicians when they can count on a large budget. This, coupled with a 
lower quality of political candidates induced by transfers, leads to an increased probability of 
re-election of incumbents. The quasi-experimental results in this paper support all these 
mechanisms.  
However, cross-country evidence shows that decentralisation is not always associated with 
higher corruption. On the contrary, Ivanyna and Shah (2010) report that it can significantly 
improve good governance and reduce corruption. These authors make particular efforts to 
capture decentralisation as the actual movement of decision-making closer to the people. 
Using different measures, they show that political decentralisation matters, even when fiscal 
decentralisation is already taken into account.  
As far as natural resources are concerned, there is a large literature on the natural resource 
curse at the national level (see for example Dalgaard and Olsson 2008 and Vicente 2010). 
However, less evidence is available on the effect of receiving large sums of natural resource 
revenue at the sub-national level. One of these studies is that of Arellano-Yanguas (2011), 
which looks at the case of Peru where natural resource revenues have been concentrated 
largely in the producing municipalities. Despite increased resources, producing municipalities 
still experience large popular discontent due to inefficient spending and increased political 
conflict. As far as the latter is concerned, the author shows that the canon minero (the 
transfer linked to resource revenues) is associated with increased social conflict. Importantly 
this effect is due to the presence of the canon minero, rather than of the extractive sector in 
itself. On the one hand, conflict arises between citizens and mining companies over the 
allocation of rents. The disconnection between local and central elites, as well as the 
institutional weakness of the central state, resulted in the inability of the national government 
to support local administrations and mitigate conflicts. On the other hand, the presence of the 
canon minero created conflicts between citizens and local governments, between levels of 
government, and amongst administrations at the same level due to the inequality in the 
distribution of the transfer. The author therefore concludes that the presence of natural 
resource revenue helps to aggravate the resource curse. More generally, it is still unclear 
whether decentralisation reduces or fosters local conflicts in practice, while this interaction is 
certainly related to the characteristics of ethnic minorities and to the local institutional 
environment (see Tranchant 2008).  
Importantly, if external sources of funding have adverse effects on the quality of institutions 
and leadership, as the evidence above seems to suggest, they would also undermine local 
revenue generation through earned sources of revenue, such as property taxes. Indeed, 
political leadership and the quality of institutions crucially affect the capacity of local 
governments to extract taxes. The quality of local leaders is one of the key elements 
underlined by Smoke (2013) and it is confirmed empirically, for example in the case of 
property tax collection in Sierra Leone (Jibao and Prichard 2013). The latter study shows that 
strong leadership and political will are crucial, particularly in the case of property taxes where 
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enforcement involves confrontation with local vested interests. This evidence, combined, 
shows how the mix of local government financing can lead to a vicious circle where high 
reliance on fiscal transfers (or other external revenues, such as natural resources) may have 
adverse political effects on local administrations, which in turn compromises their 
administrative and political capacity to collect taxes, which closes the circle by implying even 
higher reliance on external sources of funding.  
Third, existing political structures of participation and accountability matter, such as the 
existence of fair and competitive electoral systems, a tradition of democratic government, 
and institutional representation of the poor. Juul (2006: 844) argues that ‘in rural areas of 
West Africa, people seldom make substantial requests for specific services in return for the 
taxes paid. Rather, the expectation is that such services will be provided through political 
patrons at local or national level’. Depending on how new elites of local administrators 
interact with traditional structures of power, decentralisation may improve accountability or 
weaken it even more. In Sierra Leone, areas where new administrators were closely related 
to previous traditional chiefs experienced lower levels of public services and perpetuated 
elite capture (Clayton, Noveck and Levi 2015). On the other hand, when local administrators 
are in conflict with traditional chiefs, such disputes and competition lead to better economic 
outcomes as well as improved accountability and legitimacy of local governments.  
Looking at natural resources, Monteiro and Ferraz (2010) show that the presence of a 
democratic system can prevent them from having adverse effects on accountability in the 
long run. However, in the short run, the availability of royalties from natural resources still 
create a large incumbency advantage, for the two elections following the windfall boom. 
Leaders use the additional resources to increase public budgets, particularly by creating 
jobs, while no impacts can be found on service delivery (consistent with Caselli and Michaels 
2013). This indicates the strategic use of funds to create patronage jobs and reward allies. In 
the short run governments can get away with extracting rents because voters do not have 
complete information on the size of the budget increase. However, in the longer term, when 
information becomes available and the increase in public sector jobs becomes visibly 
disconnected with service delivery, voters do punish politicians. If such democratic 
mechanisms are not in place, the positive political advantages linked to accountability and 
participation are unlikely to occur. Particularly, information is key in many cases, both in the 
sense of voter ignorance on the extent of resources and in the sense of political dialogue and 
participation over budget processes (see for example Steiner 2007 and Crook 2003).  
3.4 Revenue mix 
A few studies have looked specifically at whether and how earned and unearned sources of 
revenue relate differently with economic and political outcomes. This evidence seems to 
confirm the hypothesis that earned sources of revenue are more likely than unearned 
revenues to encourage political dialogue and accountability, with positive effects on service 
delivery and ultimately on economic development. However, it is important to keep in mind 
the nuances underlined in the discussion so far and the importance of taking into account the 
local context in which local governments obtain their sources of financing.  
On the political side, Paler (2013) shows some support for this hypothesis by carrying out a 
field experiment in Indonesia. The author explores the difference between tax revenue and 
windfall revenue on accountability and the relation between citizens and the government. 
The main finding is that a higher reliance on earned revenue, compared with unearned 
windfall revenues, provides stronger incentives for citizens to monitor the budget. This result 
suggests that taxpaying enhances the demand for information about the public budget. An 
increase in the perceived share of tax in total revenue results in a greater sense of ownership 
over public funds and therefore stimulates participation, with positive implications in terms of 
accountability. On the economic side, Hoffman and Gibson (2005) try to separate the effects 
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of taxes and external transfers on service delivery. The authors analyse district-level data 
from Tanzania and Zambia to test whether the source of government income influences the 
type of policies adopted, as reflected in choices relating to the allocation of public 
expenditure. They find that in both countries an increase in local tax revenue results in a 
higher proportion of public expenditure used for service delivery, while an increase in 
external funds encourages local governments to spend more on consumption expenditures. 
Donor funds do not appear to have any systematic impact on local spending.  
So far the discussion has focused on the relation between different sources of revenue and 
various types of outcomes – economic and political. However, it is equally important to look 
at how different sources of revenue interact with each other. If fiscal transfers directly reduce 
tax effort, some of the positive effects from local revenue generation can be undermined. In 
other words, there is a question of whether external sources of revenue crowd out tax effort. 
While this issue has been touched upon in other studies reviewed here, the following 
paragraphs focus in particular on studies that try to quantitatively estimate the direct effect of 
transfers on local tax effort.  
A number of studies in the literature look at the issue of crowding out as a secondary 
research question, while the primary interest is on the effect of transfers or natural resource 
revenue on spending. In order to assess the effect on spending, however, authors ask the 
preliminary question of whether all additional revenues translate into expenditure or whether 
there is a crowding-out effect. If a new source of revenue simply crowds out another one, 
then total spending is unchanged and we may expect a small or no impact on outcomes as a 
consequence. For example, Caselli and Michaels (2013) and Litschig (2008) find no 
evidence that, respectively, natural resources or transfers decrease local taxes or other local 
revenues.  
Other studies focus specifically on the tax effort question. Table 3.1 summarises the results 
of some selected studies and shows that in all cases considered the effect of transfers on tax 
revenue is negative. However, it is important to note the difficulty of establishing a relation of 
causality, rather than a mere correlation, between transfers and local taxes. As underlined by 
Besfamille and Sanguinetti (2004: 18), ‘instead of investing in reforming its tax 
administration, the local authority can also lobby the central government to obtain 
discretionary transfers’. In their theoretical framework, therefore, transfers are endogenous 
and they are determined simultaneously with local tax collections. Transfers may also be 
negatively associated with local tax collection when poorer regions, which have a lower tax 
base, receive more transfers, precisely because they are worse off. If these issues is not 
tackled properly in the econometric estimation of the effect of transfers, we cannot interpret 
the negative effects as adverse causal impacts. These challenges are clearly related to the 
previous discussion on methods in section 3.1.  
Table 3.1 Local tax effort: A crowding-out effect? 
Study Country Effect on tax 
Liu and Zhao (2011) China negative 
Mogues and Benin (2012) Ghana negative 
Panda (2009) India negative 
Rajaraman and Vasishtha (2000) India negative 
Sivagnanam and Naganathan (1999) India negative 




The overall question in this paper was: did fiscal decentralisation deliver on its promises? 
The immediate answer is that the evidence on political and economic outcomes is mixed and 
often disappointing. Increased local expenditure is not always transferred to citizens through 
better services and improved living standards; while political patronage and elite capture are 
still widespread problems. However, there are some success stories that should be 
acknowledged.  
Perhaps the disappointing results are due more to unrealistic promises about 
decentralisation, than a failure of decentralisation altogether. There are many reasons why 
the theory, including the possible benefits from fiscal decentralisation, is out of sync with the 
practice, as discussed in section 3. Importantly, even a well-designed system may not be 
beneficial when it is implemented poorly. In other words, failure can occur even in presence 
of an acceptable design. 
Section 3 has identified several factors that are key to success or failure. They can almost be 
seen as preconditions that need to be in place if the theoretical benefits of decentralisation 
are to be realised. For example, the relation between the national and sub-national levels is 
key on several levels. First, the central government should be politically committed to 
decentralisation and willing to effectively transfer power and authority to local governments. 
Second, it should provide strong leadership on objectives such as revenue mobilisation and 
poverty reduction. A strong state can also manage conflicts that may arise, both amongst 
sub-national governments for the distribution of central revenues and between local 
governments and citizens. 
Existing local conditions, for example in terms of participation, capacity, and size of 
government, can determine the extent to which the benefits can be reaped in practice. While 
fiscal decentralisation can enhance accountability, a basic level of political participation and 
engagement at the local level is necessary for such an accountability relation to be 
established in the first place. So the relation between demands for accountability and 
successful fiscal decentralisation works in both ways. Similarly, some studies show that there 
may be a minimum necessary threshold of public expenditure below which decentralisation 
does not yield its promised beneficial effects. 
More generally, there is a complexity of factors that explains the success of decentralisation 
and the outcomes from different sources of financing. The mix of critical factors is country-
specific and highly dependent on existing conditions before and after decentralisation is 
implemented, including the reasons why the country embarked on such a process. 
The available evidence seems to suggest a higher risk of adverse political and economic 
effects from unearned sources of revenue, such as transfers and natural resources. Instead, 
earned local taxes can trigger positive effects through participation and accountability, as 
discussed particularly in section 3.4. However, the evidence base on the positive effects of 
earned sources of revenue at the sub-national level is still rather thin. 
Finally, additional rigorous research is required to shed more light on the factors and 
mechanisms through which decentralisation can be beneficial, both economically and 
politically. Such research will be facilitated as more data become available, as the lack or 
unavailability of sufficient data is one of the biggest obstacles to expanding the evidence 
base. More and better data may also encourage researchers to use methods that can 





Aldasoro, I. and Seiferling (2014) Vertical Fiscal Imbalances and the Accumulation of 
Government Debt, Working Paper 14/209, International Monetary Fund 
 
Altunbaş, Y. and Thornton, J. (2012) ‘Fiscal Decentralization and Governance’, Public 
Finance Review 40.1: 6685 
 
Arellano-Yanguas, J. (2011) ‘Aggravating the Resource Curse: Decentralisation, Mining and 
Conflict in Peru’, Journal of Development Studies 47.4: 617–38 
 
Arellano-Yanguas, J. and Mejia-Acosta, A. (2014) Extractive Industries, Revenue Allocation 
and Local Politics, Working Paper 4, UNRISD 
 
Bahl, R. and Martinez-Vazquez, J. (2007) The Property Tax in Developing Countries: Current 
Practice and Prospects, Working Paper WP07RB1, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy 
 
Bahl, R. and Martinez-Vazquez, J. (2006) Sequencing Fiscal Decentralization, World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper 3914, World Bank 
 
Banful, A.B. (2011) ‘Do Formula-Based Intergovernmental Transfer Mechanisms Eliminate 
Politically Motivated Targeting? Evidence from Ghana’, Journal of Development 
Economics 96: 380–90 
 
Bardhan, P. and Mookherjee, D. (2006) ‘The Rise of Local Governments: An Overview’, in  
P. Bardhan and D. Mookherjee (eds), Decentralisation and Local Governance in 
Developing Countries, The MIT Press 
 
Besfamille, M. and Sanguinetti, P. (2004) ‘Exerting Local Tax Effort or Lobbying for Central 
Transfers?: Evidence from Argentina’, Econometric Society 2004 Latin American 
Meetings, Econometric Society 249, Econometric Society 
 
Bird, R.M. (2012) Subnational Taxation in Large Emerging Countries: BRIC Plus One, IMFG 
Papers 6, Munk School of Global Affairs 
 
Bird, R.M. (2011) ‘Subnational Taxation in Developing Countries: A Review of the Literature’, 
Journal of International Commerce, Economics and Policy 2.01: 139–61 
 
Bird, R.M. (1990) ‘Intergovernmental Finance and Local Taxation in Developing Countries: 
Some Basic Considerations for Reformers’, Public Administration and Development 
10.3: 277–88 
 
Bird, R.M. and Slack, E. (2006) Taxing Land and Property in Emerging Economies: Raising 
Revenue...and More?, ITP Paper 0605, Joseph L. Rotman School of Management, 
University of Toronto 
 
Bird, R.M. and Smart, M. (2002) ‘Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers: International Lessons 
for Developing Countries’, World Development 30.6: 899–912 
 
Bird, R.M. and Vaillancourt, F. (1998) Fiscal Decentralisation in Developing Countries, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Boadway, R. and Shah, A. (eds) (2007) Intergovernmental Transfers, World Bank 
27 
 
Bordignon, M.; Manasse, P. and Tabellini, G. (2001) ‘Optimal Regional Redistribution under 
Asymmetric Information’, American Economic Review 91.3: 709–23 
 
Brautigam, D.; Fjeldstad, O.-H. and Moore, M. (2008) Taxation and State Building in 
Developing Countries: Capacity and Consent, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Brollo, F. (2010) Who is Punishing Corrupt Politicians – Voters or the Central Government? 
Evidence from the Brazilian Anti-Corruption Program, Working Paper 336, Innocenzo 
Gasparini Institute for Economic Research (IGIER), Università Bocconi 
 
Brollo, F. and Nanniccini, T. (2012) ‘Tying Your Enemy’s Hands in Close Races: The Politics 
of Federal Transfers in Brazil’, American Political Science Review 106.4: 742–61 
 
Brollo, F.; Nannicini, T.; Perotti, R. and Tabellini, G. (2013) ‘The Political Resource Curse’, 
American Economic Review 103.5: 1759–96 
 
Caldeira, E.; Foucault, M. and Rota-Graziosi, G. (2012) Does Decentralisation Facilitate 
Access to Poverty-related Services? Evidence from Benin, Working Paper 18118, 
National Bureau of Economic Research 
 
Case, A. (2001) ‘Election Goals and Income Redistribution: Recent Evidence from Albania’, 
European Economic Review 45.3: 405–23 
 
Caselli, F. and Michaels, G. (2013) ‘Do Oil Windfalls Improve Living Standards? Evidence 
from Brazil’, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 5.1: 208–38 
 
Clayton, A.; Noveck, J. and Levi, M. (2915) When Elites Meet: Decentralization, Power-
sharing, and Public Goods Provision in Post-conflict Sierra Leone, Policy Research 
Working Paper 7335, World Bank 
 
Crook, R.C. (2007) ‘ “No Party” Politics and Local Democracy in Africa: Rawlings’ Ghana in 
the 1990s and the “Ugandan Model” ’, Democratization 6.4: 114–38 
 
Crook, R.C. (2003) ‘Decentralisation and Poverty Reduction in Africa: The Politics of 
LocalCentral Relations’, Public Administration and Development 23.1: 77–88 
 
Crook, R.C. (1996) ‘Democracy, Participation and Responsiveness: A Case Study of 
Relations between the Ivorian Communes and their Citizens’, Public Administration 74: 
695–720 
 
Crook, R.C. and Sverisson, A.S. (2001) Decentralisation and Poverty-Alleviation in 
Developing Countries: A Comparative Analysis or, is West Bengal Unique?, Working 
Paper 130, Brighton: IDS 
 
Dahlberg, M.; Mork, E.; Rattso, J. and Agren, H. (2008) ‘Using a Discontinuous Grant Rule to 
Identify the Effect of Grants on Local Taxes and Spending’, Journal of Public 
Economics 92: 2320–35 
 
Dalgaard, C.-J. and Olsson, O. (2008) ‘Windfall Gains, Political Economy and Economic 
Development’, Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African 
Economies (CSAE) 17: 72–109 
 
28 
de Mello, L. (2011) ‘Does Fiscal Decentralisation Strengthen Social Capital? Cross-country 
Evidence and the Experiences of Brazil and Indonesia’, Environment and Planning C: 
Government and Policy 29: 28196 
Devarajan, S.; Khemani, S. and Shah, S. (2009) ‘The Politics of Partial Decentralization’, in 
E. Ahmad and G. Brosio (eds), Does Decentralization Enhance Service Delivery and 
Poverty Reduction?, Edward Elgar 
 
Dixit, A. and Londregan, J. (1998) ‘Fiscal Federalism and Redistributive Politics’, Journal of 
Public Economics, Elsevier 68.2: 153–80 
 
Faguet, J.-P. (2008) ‘Decentralisation’s Effects on Public Investment: Evidence and Policy 
Lessons from Bolivia and Colombia’, Journal of Development Studies 44.8: 110021 
 
Faguet, J.-P. (2004) ‘Does Decentralization Increase Government Responsiveness to Local 
Needs?: Evidence from Bolivia’, Journal of Public Economics 88.3–4: 867–93 
 
Faguet, J.-P.; Fox, A.M. and Poeschi, C. (2014) Does Decentralizaion Strengthen or Weaken 
the State? Authority and Social Learning in a Supple State, Working Paper, 
Department of International Development, London School of Economics and Political 
Science 
 
Fairfield, T. and Jorratt, M. (2014) Top Income Shares, Business Profits, and Effective Tax 
Rates in Contemporary Chile, Working Paper 17, International Centre for Tax and 
Development (ICTD) 
 
Ferreira do Vale, H. (2010) ‘Changes from Below: Intergovernmental Politics in 
Democratising Federations’, PhD thesis, European University Institute, Department of 
Political and Social Sciences 
 
Fjeldstad, O.-H. (2002) ‘Collectors, Councillors and Donors: Local Government Taxation and 
StateSociety Relations in Tanzania’, IDS Bulletin 33.3: 115, 
http://bulletin.ids.ac.uk/idsbo/article/view/1199 (accessed 4 April 2016) 
 
Fjeldstad, O.-H. (2001a) Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in Developing Countries: A 
Review of Issues, Working Paper 11, Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) 
 
Fjeldstad, O.-H. (2001b) ‘Taxation, Coercion and Donors: Local Government Tax 
Enforcement in Tanzania’, The Journal of Modern African Studies 39: 289–306 
 
Fjeldstad, O.-H. and Heggstad, K. (2012) Local Government Revenue Mobilisation in 
Anglophone Africa, Working Paper 6, Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) 
 
Fjeldstad, O.-H. and Heggstad, K. (2011) The Tax Systems in Mozambique, Tanzania and 
Zambia: Capacity and Constraints, CMI Report 3, Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) 
 
Hoffman, B.D. and Gibson, C.C. (2005) ‘Fiscal Governance and Public Services: Evidence 
from Tanzania and Zambia’, mimeo, Department of Political Science, University of 
California, San Diego 
 
Ivanyna, M. and Shah, A. (2010) Decentralization (Localization) and Corruption: New Cross-
country Evidence, Policy Research Working Paper 5299, World Bank 
 
Jibao, S. and Prichard, W. (2013) Rebuilding Local Government Finance after Conflict: The 
Political Economy of Property Tax Reform in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone, Working 
Paper 12, ICTD 
29 
Juul, K. (2006) ‘Decentralization, Local Taxation and Citizenship in Senegal’, Development 
and Change 37.4: 821–46 
 
Kelly, R. and Musunu, Z. (2000) Implementing Property Tax Reform in Tanzania, Working 
Paper WP00RK1, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy 
 
Kelsall, T. (2000) ‘Governance, Local Politics and Districtization in Tanzania: The 1998 
Arumeru Tax Revolt’, African Affairs 99.397: 533–51 
 
Letelier, L.E. (2011) ‘Theory and Evidence of Municipal Borrowing in Chile’, Public Choice 
146: 395–411 
 
Litschig, S. (2008) ‘Intergovernmental Transfers and Elementary Education: Quasi-
Experimental Evidence from Brazil’, mimeo, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Department of 
Economics and Business 
 
Liu, Y. and Zhao, J. (2011) ‘Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers and Local Tax Efforts: 
Evidence from Provinces in China’, Journal of Economic Policy Reform 14.4: 295–300 
 
Livingstone, I. and Charlton, R. (1998) ‘Raising Local Authority District Revenues through 
Direct Taxation in a Low-Income Developing Country: Evaluating Uganda’s GPT’, 
Public Administration and Development 18.5: 499–517 
 
Loayza, N.V.; Rigolini, J. and Calvo-Gonzalez, O. (2011) More Than You Can Handle: 
Decentralization and Spending Ability of Peruvian Municipalities, Policy Research 
Working Paper 5763, World Bank 
 
McLure, C.E. (2001) ‘The Tax Assignment Problem: Ruminations on How Theory and 
Practice Depend on History’, National Tax Journal 54.2: 339–64 
 
Maro, P.S. (1990) ‘The Impact of Decentralization on Spatial Equity and Rural Development 
in Tanzania’, World Development, Elsevier 18.5: 673–93 
 
Martinez-Vazquez, J.; McLure, C.E. and Vaillancourt, F. (2006) ‘Revenues and Expenditures 
in an Intergovernmental Framework’, in R.M. Bird and F. Vaillancourt (eds), 
Perspectives on Fiscal Federalism, World Bank 
 
Merat, J. (2004) ‘Taxation and Local Government Accountability in a Clientelist Context: 
Colombia’, Public Administration and Development 24.3: 247–54 
 
Mogues, T. and Benin, S. (2012) ‘Do External Grants to District Governments Discourage 
Own Revenue Generation? A Look at Local Public Finance Dynamics in Ghana’, World 
Development 40.5: 1054–67 
 
Monkam, N.F. (2011) ‘Property Taxation in Senegal: Legislation and Practice’, Journal of 
Property Tax Assessment and Administration 8.3: 41–60 
 
Monteiro, J. and Ferraz, C. (2010) ‘Does Oil Make Leaders Unaccountable? Evidence from 
Brazil’s Offshore Oil Boom’, mimeo, Pontificia Universidade Catolica do Rio de Janeiro, 
Department of Economics 
 
Moore, M. (2013) Obstacles to Increasing Tax Revenues in Low Income Countries, Working 
Paper 15, ICTD 
 
30 
Moore, M. (1998) ‘Death without Taxes: Democracy, State Capacity, and Aid Dependency in 
The Fourth World’, in G. White and M. Robinson (eds), Towards A Democratic 
Developmental State, Oxford University Press: 84–121 
 
Morgandi, M. (2008) Extractive Industries Revenue Distribution at the Sub-National Level, 
Report, Revenue Watch Institute 
 
Musgrave, R.A. (1959) The Theory of Public Finance: A Study in Public Economy, McGraw-
Hill 
 
Oates, W. (2005) ‘Toward a Second-generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism’, International 
Tax and Public Finance 12: 34973 
 
Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, L.K.; Msami, J. and Ngalewa, E. (2010) Local Government Finances 
and Financial Management in Tanzania: Empirical Evidence of Trends 2000–2007, 
Special Paper 2, Policy Research for Development, Tanzania (REPOA) 
 
Olken, B.A. and Singhal, M. (2011) ‘Informal Taxation’, American Economic Journal: Applied 
Economics 3.4: 1–28 
 
Olowu, D. and Smoke, P. (1992) ‘Determinants of Success in African Local Governments: An 
Overview’, Public Administration and Development 12.1: 1–17 
 
Paler, L. (2013) ‘Keeping the Public Purse: An Experiment in Windfalls, Taxes, and the 
Incentives to Restrain Government’, American Political Science Review 107.4: 70625 
 
Panda, P.K. (2009) ‘Central Fiscal Transfers and States’ Own-revenue Efforts in India: Panel 
Data Models’, The Journal of Applied Economic Research 3.3: 223–42 
 
Pimhidzai, O. and Fox, L. (2011) ‘Taking from the Poor or Local Economic Development: The 
Dilemma of Taxation of Small Informal Enterprises in Uganda’, paper prepared as part 
of the World Bank Africa regional project on improving the productivity and reducing 
risk of household enterprises, World Bank 
 
Prud’homme, R. (1995) ‘The Dangers of Decentralisation’, The World Bank Research 
Observer 10.2: 201–20 
 
Rajaraman, I. and Vasishtha, G. (2000) ‘Impact of Grants on Tax Effort of Local 
Government’, Economic and Political Weekly 35.33: 2943–48 
 
Reinikka, R. and Svensson, J. (2004) ‘Local Capture: Evidence from a Central Government 
Transfer Program in Uganda’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 119.2: 679–705 
 
Sacchi, A. and Salotti, S. (2014) The Influence of Decentralised Taxes and 
Intergovernmental Grants on Local Spending Volatility, GEN Working Paper 5, 
Universidade Vigo, Governance and Economics Research Network 
 
Sepulveda, C.F. and Martinez-Vazquez, J. (2011) ‘The Consequences of Fiscal 
Decentralization on Poverty and Income Equality’, Environment and Planning C: 
Government and Policy 29: 32143 
 
Shah, A. (2001) Balance, Accountability and Responsiveness: Lessons about 
Decentralization, Policy Research Working Paper 2021, World Bank 
 
31 
Sivagnanam, J.K. and Naganathan, M. (1999) Federal Transfers and the Tax Efforts of the 
States in India, MPRA Paper 3208, Munich Personal RePEc Atchive (MPRA) 
 
Smoke, P. (2013) Why Theory and Practice are Different: The Gap Between Principles and 
Reality in Subnational Revenue Systems, Working Paper 13, Andrew Young School of 
Policy Studies, International Center for Public Policy 
 
Smoke, P. (1993) ‘Local Government Fiscal Reform in Developing Countries: Lessons from 
Kenya’, World Development 21.6: 901–23 
 
Sow, M. and Razafimahefa, I.F. (2015) Fiscal Decentralization and the Efficiency of Public 
Service Delivery, Working Paper 15/59, International Monetary Fund 
 
Steiner, S. (2007) ‘Decentralisation and Poverty: Conceptual Framework and Application to 
Uganda’, Public Administration and Development 27.2: 175–85 
 
Tanzi, V. (1996) ‘Fiscal Federalism and Decentralisation: A Review of Some Efficiency and 
Macroeconomic Aspects’, Annual World Bank conference on development economics, 
World Bank 
 
Therkildsen, O. (2001) ‘Understanding Taxation in Poor African Countries: A Critical Review 
of Selected Perspectives’, conference paper, Forum for Development Studies 
 
Ticci, E. (2011) Extractive Industries and Local Development in the Peruvian Extractive 
Industries and Local Development in the Peruvian Highlands: Socio-Economic Impacts 
of the Mid-1990s Mining Boom, EUI Working Paper 14, European University Institute 
 
Tranchant, J.-P. (2008) ‘Fiscal Decentralisation, Institutional Quality and Ethnic Conflict: A 
Panel Data Analysis, 19852001’, Conflict, Security and Development 8.4: 491514 
 
Tsui, K. (2005) ‘Local Tax System, Intergovernmental Transfers and China’s Local Fiscal 
Disparities’, Journal of Comparative Economics 33.1: 173–96 
 
Vicente, P.C. (2010) ‘Does Oil Corrupt? Evidence from a Natural Experiment in West Africa’, 
Journal of Development Economics 92.1: 28–38 
 
von Haldenwang, C. (2015) ‘The Political Cost of Local Revenue Mobilisation: 
Decentralisation of the Property Tax in Indonesia’, mimeo, Deutsches Institut für 
Entwicklungspolitik 
 
von Haldenwang, C.; von Schiller, A. and Garcia, M. (2014) ‘Tax Collection in Developing 
Countries – New Evidence on Semi-autonomous Revenue Agencies (SARAs)’, Journal 
of Development Studies 50.4: 54155 
 
Weingast, B.R. (2014) ‘Second Generation Fiscal Federalism: Political Aspects of 
Decentralization and Economic Development’, World Development 53.C: 1425 
 
Weingast, B.R. (2009) ‘Second Generation Fiscal Federalism: The Implications of Fiscal 
Incentives’, Journal of Urban Economics 65.3: 27993 
 
World Bank (1988) Opportunities and Risks in Managing the World Economy. Public Finance 




Zhang, Z. and Martinez-Vazquez, J. (2003) The System of Equalization Transfers in China, 
Working Paper 12, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies 
 
Zhuravskaya, E.V. (2000) ‘Incentives to Provide Local Public Goods: Fiscal Federalism, 
Russian Style’, Journal of Public Economics 76.3: 337–68 
